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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE.OF THE CASE
The Defendant-Appellant, Thomas Devon Gee,
appeals from his conviction of Murder in the
First Degree in violation of Utah Code Ann.
Sec. 76-30-1 (1953), on jury trial in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake
County, State of Utah, the Honorable D. Frank
Wilkins, Judge, presiding, and the sentence of
imprisonment at hard labor for life imposed
thereon.

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant was tried on a charge of
first degree murder before a jury in the Third
Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake
County, Utah, with Judge D. Frank Wilkins presiding.

The trial began June 19, 1970, and was

concluded June 24, 1970; the jury returned a
verdict of guilty as charged with recommendation of leniency.

The appellant filed motions

to dismiss, in arrest of judgment and for a new
trial, along with supporting authorities and
affidavits.

Upon argument to the Court, all

motions were denied.

Appellant was sentenced

to a term of life imprisonment and appeals from
the verdict and judgment.

A certificate of pro-

bable cause for appeal was signed by presiding
Judge D. Frank Wilkins on July 20, 1970.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks reversal of the judgment of the lower court and a dismissal of the
action, or in the alternative, reversal and
remand for further proceedings or for a new
trial, with directions and instructions to the
trial court.
-2-

STATEMENT OF FACTS
This appeal presents to the Court vital
questions concerning the sufficiency of evidence, corroboration of accomplices, and constitutional due process of law.

Therefore,

it is necessary to set forth in some detail the
material facts established by each witness in
the court below.
The first portion of this statement sets
, forth the medical evidence concerning the nature
and extent of the injuries sustained by the deceased, the nature of the condition causing his
death, and the medical opinions concerning the
possible causes of those injuries; and the
material portions of the testimony.tending to
show a causal connection of the defendant with
those injuries is set forth in the second portion.
Marilyn Peterson brought her son Craig into the emergency room of the hospital at about
10:00 p.m. on the evening of October 5, 1969.
During the initial examination the doctors observed that the child was breathing on his own
and had a heartbeat, but that he was not moving
and not responsive; and that there were multi-

-3-

ple discreet bruises about the face, head, and
lower back and legs.
fixed and dialated.

(R.240)

The eyes were

Mrs. Peterson stated upon

'her arrival at the emergency room that she had
left the boy briefly in the care of her boyfriend who told her that he had fallen down the
stairs with the child shortly after he noticed
the boy having another seizure; that Craig had
swallowed his tongue.

(R. 295)

The bruises on the child's head along with
the condition diagnosed as papilledema suggested
the existence of intercranial pressure.

Craig

Peterson underwent surgery until about 3 :00'
a.m. of October 6, 1969, and the pressure on
the brain was relieved as the excess blood was
drained off.

Craig was kept under continuous

treatment and observation untiLhis death during the early morning hours of the following

day.

The cause of death was due to subdural

hematoma and brain injury attributed to traumatic injury of an unspecified nature and unknown origin.

(R. 299, 309)

One of the examining physicians had remembered treating the child on several previous
occasions and suspected that the injuries he
saw were an indication of possible child abuse.

-4-

Law enforcement officers of the Salt Lake County
Sheriff's Department arrived at the hospital
shortly after 10:00 p.m. October 5, 1969, and
1

conducted an investigation.

On the morning of

the child's death, the appellant was arrested
and charged with first degree murder.
The State at trial relied on the theory
that the evidence would show premeditation and
deliberation, or in the alternative a depraved
mind.

(R. 106)
Dr. Edward F. Wilson was called on .behalf

of the State and testified that he had performed an autopsy on the deceased

1969.

He was the assistant medical examiner

for Utah and was a specialist in forensic pathology, which is the study of injury and disease
as it relates to legal questions.

His exper-

ience included approximately 1,300 autopsies to
determine cause of death, and he had testified
and been qualified in a number of courts as a
medical expert.
He explained that subdural hematoma occurs
when something strikes the head causing the
brain to move at a little different rate than
the skull and thus causing bleeding when the
blood vessels connecting the brain to the skull

-5-

stretch and tear.

(R. 310)

He stated that in

this case it was difficult to say whether the
trauma was due to the head striking an immobile
object, or whether it was struck by a movable
object.

The trauma, in his opinion was caused

by a dull blow.

Although there was some evi-

dence of multiple blows, the hematoma could
have come from many, or could have just come
from one.

(R. 310)

His conclusions in this

regard were essentially the same ones reached
by the treating and examining physicians.

Dr. R. Chad Halversen and Dr. Theodore S.
Roberts treated Craig's injuries shortly after
, he arrived in the emergency room of the Univeri sity of Utah Medical Center.

Both were employed

there as residents in neurosurgery, and both
were involved in the surgery described as burr
holes, which relieved the pressure on the brain.

(R. 244, 299)

In similar terms these physicians

described the nature of the hematoma, and discussed their observations of the head injuries.

(R. 240-245) (R. 299-302)

Dr. Roberts was not

able to state factually one way or another as
to whether the hematoma was due to a single
blow or a succession of blows, although he recalled that the condition usually appears in
children following a succession of blows(R.303)

-6-

The bruises about the scalp were indicitive of
some force being applied to the head, but a
hematoma can develop from a blow at any point;
and the presence of the papilledema seemed to
indicate that the brain had already been under
pressure, at the time of the operation, for at
least 24 hours.(R.299-300) The injuries on each
side of the head appeared to be of recent origin
and about the same age, but he was unable to
state with certainty whether the hematoma or
the swelling to the brain occurred first in time.
The damage to the left side of the brain was
caused by blows, while the damage to the right
side was due to swelling and inflammation. Although these injuries could have been simultaneous, it appeared unlikely.(R. 302).
Dr. Halversen added that it would take a
fair trauma to cause the hematoma, and suggested
that from the location of the blood clot it was
possible that the fatal blow could have come
across the ear, striking the child behind the
1

ear. (R. 251)

Traumatic injury means forceful

injury.(R. 256)

He stated that one cannot

really equate the force of the blow with the
rupture of intercranial blood vessels.(R. 250)
But he could not say with assurance which of
several apparent blows caused the condition.
He did describe, however, a linear bruise that

-7-

existed across the temple, the ear, and the left
mastoid process, accompanied by surrounding swelling.

The bruises on the ear itself were round

types, and were not, in his opinion, caused by
the same object, and possibly not even at the
same time.

In addition he noted that there was

an abrasion in the middle of the back, oozing
blood, that appeared to be more recent than the
bruises on the backs of the legs.(R.255-256)
Dr. Halversen further stated that he was
unable to ascertain the size of the object which
had apparently come in contact with the child's
head, nor did he think it was medically possible
to do so.

He could only say that the cause of

death was intercranial injury due to traumatic
injuries to the head.(R. 254)
Dr. Donald K.Nicholson had been admitted to
the practice of medicine for two years, and was
completing his last two years of internship with
the University Medical Center's Department of
Pediatrics, where he held the position of the
second neuro resident,

(R. 258) when he had

occasion to come in contact with Craig Peterson.
He was present in the emergency room on October
5th along with Dr. Halversen, and assisted in
the examination at that time.

-8-

(R. 275) He had

treated the child on several previous occasions

and discussed the possibility that Craig was
an abused child with Dr. Halversen during the
course of the medical consultations.(R. 249,

254)

This possibility was also discussed with

the police, after the fact.
The complete medical records indicated that
Craig Peterson had been seen at the outpatient
clinic a number of times during the year 1969,
but mostly for the usual or common problems of
childhood.

These included some sickness, a

constant diaper rash, occasional running fever

and an iron deficiency anemia. (R. 283)

Dr.

Nicholson first saw Craig on September 8th for
a routine follow-up on the anemia problem,

and noted nothing unusual at that tiine.(R.279)
Marilyn Peterson again brought Craig into
the hospital on September 17th and Dr. Nicholson again treated the boy.

He found an injury

described as a very well demarcated circular
burn ••• a deep second or possibly third degree •••
a nice clean burn •••• there was no infection
around it ••• and about 3 or 4 millimeters deep.
(R. 259-260)

He became suspicious because the

burn was deep and because the mother could give
him no good explanation as to how it occurred.

-9-

A second degree burn involves the outer layer
of the skin and usually foI'Dls blisters, while
a third degree burn is deeper and does not. He
felt that the burn he saw was deep second or
possibly third since he found no remnants of
a blister and concluded that it was unlikely
that the boy could have burned himself.

,

(R.

259-262)
The demarcation, as well as the size and
shape were similar to what he thought might
be caused by an automobile cigarette lighter,
and the cleanliness suggested that perhaps
someone must have held something against the
foot.

He identified Exhibit #22 (cigarette

lighter seized from defendant's car) as the
kind of instrument that could cause such a
clean circular burn--it appeared to be about
the same size and shape.

(R. 260)

Craig Peterson was hospitalized by Dr.
Nicholson on September 26th after he was
brought in for the treatment of several additional injuries, including blisters on the tops
of the toes and bruises across the backs of
the legs.

(R. 262-269)

Having treated the

child so recently for another burn, the doctor became even more suspicious, and noted
the fact in the hospital medical records.

-10-

Dr. Nicholson identified the color slide
photographs depicting the blisters on the toes ,
the slides showing the bruises on the backs
of the legs, and also the slide depicting the
round burn, and discussed these pictures
before the jury with reference to his observations made at the time of treatment.

(R. 258)

He stated that he had arranged for these
photographs because he had suspected abuse
on the basis of his diagnosis and treatment
of the round burn back on the 17th of September. (R. 263)

He identified the bruises

shown in Exhibits #4 and #9 as being similar
to those he witnessed on Craig Peterson. The
round burn was Exhibit #8, and the blistered
toes were shown in Exhibit #3. In his opinion
the blisters were most likely caused by hot
water being applied to the tops of the toes.

He recalled that he had examined Craig during
the morning hours, probably between 9:30 a.m.
and ll:OOa.m ••• there were no blisters on the
soles of the feet, and he didn't recall notic-

ing any redness in that area either, or anything else unusual about the feet except for
the prior round burn.

(R. 266-270)

He said

that the blistered toes could be consistent
, with rwming hot water across them, as he
-11-

found no redness or blisters on the soles, and
thought that water hot enough to cause the
blisters on top should also have necessarily
blistered the soles.
son identified Exhibit
Exhibit

#3

(R. 266-270)

#8

Dr. Nichol-

(the round burn),

(blistered toes), Exhibit

(bruises on legs), and Exhibit

#9

#4

(leg bruises).

These color slide photographs were shown to the
jury during portions of the doctor's testimony
by means of a projector and screen.

Dr. Nichol-

son stated that these photographs were taken at
the hospital after he suspected child abuse.
It was also on September 26th that Marilyn
Peterson told Dr. Nicholson about Craig suffering another fit or breathing spell that morning,
and she described his symptoms.

Craig would

hold his breath, pass out, turn blue and swallow
his tongue.

He had been having fits or tantrums

in the past, but this was the worst one yet.
Dr. Nicholson decided to keep the boy in the
hospital for a few days for observation and
that Craig was released about October 1st.

The

last time he saw Craig was when Craig was in
the emergency room on the evening of October 5th
and his testimony concerning the appearance of
the child at that time was similar to that of
the other doctors and included his identifica-12-

tion of Exhibit #1 and Exhibit #2.

(R. 27 5)

This doctor expressed the opinion that a
physician may have reason to suspect an abused
child if there are repeated small injuries or
even a single incident where the explanation

offered by the person bringing the child in for
treatment is very poor, non-existent or one
which seems nearly inconceivable when compared
to the observed-injuries.

(R.

277)

Dr. Halvtr-

sori gene 1°ally agreed, although he described child
abuse as involving multiple injuries of the
1

I
I

kind not ordinarily sustained in day to day
living, and noted that a child can be considered

1abused due to symptoms of neglect as well as by
!

I
1

trauma, although usually traumatic injury is a
part of it.

(R. 252)

Dr. Wilson stated that a battered child
involves a non-accidental physical injury to a
minor of severe degree, occasionally resulting
.in fatality inflicted by the people responsible
for the ca1·e of the

(R. 214)

According to Dr. Nicholson, the combination of observed trauma along with the medical
history is most significant, and he admitted
that it is very difficult to explain abuse without a very clear and known medical history.

-13-

He admitted that during the preceding year he
had seen over 600 children, had treated them,
and was aware of only four or five cases of
abuse, and these wer·e based in large part on a
known medical history.

(R. 278)

He testified that when Marilyn brought
Craig in on the 26th, she first told him that
the toe blisters were probably caused by shoes
which were too tight.

After he questioned her

more about it, she then told him that maybe the
bath water was too warm that morning.

She said

that the child had been sick and holding his
breath and swallowing his tongue and told him
more about the onset of the seizures.

(R. 291-

294)
The only conversation he recalled that concerned the defendant vas that he remembered her
telling one time that her boy friend

to

be pretty good to the child, but he couldn 1 t
call any other statements.

He noted

marks in the medical records.

re-

re-

(R. 293)

Dr. Nicholson testified on cross-examination that when he diagnosed the possible cause
of the round burn, he was unaware that the child
had been treated several days previously for it,
and admitted that at that time he had not taken
occasion to examine the complete medical

-14-

His opinion then was that the burn he

saw could not possibly have been an older burn-if the child had stepped on something and then

jumped off right away, there would possibly have
i>een a first degree burn or possibly a blister.

i

lie answered that he would be unable to tell anything at all if he had seen a burn described as
being aark, crusted over, and smaller--that it
could be caused by stepping on a cigarette or
something else hot-- it was quite possible.

But

he saw a burn that was very round and clean.
\(R. 285-286)
Deputy Sheriff John W. Mabnborg testified

i

llliat he was the officer in charge of the inves/tigation and examination of the premises located

I

lat 6450 South 13th East at about 3 :00 a .m. on
6, 1969.

Deputy Gunnarson testified

that Exhibit #10 was the diagram of the scene
prepared at that time--that he took measurements.
I

(R. 110)

Deputy Hadfield testified that he

W;\S

stationed in front of the house from 12:05 a.m.
,mtil 2:58 a.m. of the same morning, and that
I

nobody went in or out until Marilyn and the
other deputies arrived, when he left.

(R. 202)

Deputy Malmborg identified Exhibits Nos.

12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, and 19--photographs
·,f the scene taken that same morning after

1
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his arrival there around 3:00 a.m.(R. 122-23)
He questioned Marilyn at the hospital, after he
talked to the doctors, and questioned her again
at the house, while other deputies were complet, ing the photography.
Marilyn Peterson testified that earlier in
the evening, around 7 o'clock, they arrived at
his brother Allen's apartment where they met the
defendant's mother and step-father, who helped
them tow the defendant's old car from his father's
house out to the house on 13th East.

Craig was

with Marilyn, asleep on the front seat of the
defendant's car.

(R. 147)

When they got out to

the house, she put Craig up in his crib, but did
not undress him.

They all talked for a while,

and as they were leaving, she left to go to a
nearby store for some more milk; she remembered
that they pulled out of the driveway right behind
her.

(R. 149)

Craig was wearing blue coveralls

that night, and still had a bandage on one foot.
(R. 148)
She related that she was at the store for
about 15 minutes.

When she returned home, she

found the defendant s:tanding on the back porch
holding Craig--he had his hands under his arms
and was holding him out at arms length; Craig
was wearing only a T-shirt.
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(R. 150)

Craig was limp and unconscious, and there
was a large scrape on his back.

She said that

the defendant told her that Craig had taken another convulsion, so she sent him down to the
nearby fire station for the ambulance, while she
took Craig back inside and tried to revive him.
Two firemen and the ambulance came, and took her
along with Craig to the hospital, arriving there

(R. 150) She recalled that Dr.

;around

Nicholson was called to the emergency room.
When she returned to the house, along with

I

officer Malmborg and a couple of deputies, she

i,

found Craig's clothes on the floor upstairs and
a diaper on the kitchen floor. (R. 155)
tified

I

that the defendant had never undressed

',Craig before.
I

She tes-

They asked her about the scrape

on the back, and she told them that the defendant
said "I guess he got that when I fell down the

!stairs with him."

(R. 152-153)

October 5th was a Sunday, and Craig had been
1

1

very quiet all that day.

The defendant, Marilyn

and Craig, had spent the afternoon finding things
for the deer hunt, and had returned for dinner
around 5 o'clock before leaving again to go over
to

ltad

his brother's apartment.

(R. 144)

Marilyn

had Craig home for the hospital about a week,

>he remembered,

:ime.

(R. 200)

and had to hold him most of the
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Marilyn testified that Craig had some round
bruises about his ears, mainly in front of them,
but Daid that they had been there for a couple
of days prior to the 5th of October.
identified Exhibits

#1

after the surgery.

She noticed that there were

and

#2

She also

as her little boy

some additional injuries depicted that weren't
there before, including the surgeon's incisions.

(R. 144) (R. 196) She pointed out some injury
inside the ear, and said that Craig had never
had any prior ear trouble.
She identified the slides depicting the toe
blisters, and said that these occurred one mo:rning
in late September; Craig had been sick and had
thrown up in the crib and made a mess, and the
defendant took him down to clean him up, and
shortly thereafter she heard him cry and went
down herself to check the water and found that
it was too hot for Craig when she put her hand
in it.

Although there were no burns then, the

feet were really red, and they started to blister
about 20 minutes later.

(R. 139)

It was about a week before this that Craig
got the bruises on the legs; the same day she
moved out to 13th East with Margie she went to
the store for a short time, leaving the defendant
with Craig and Margie's kids, and returned to
find Craig with a scrape on his head from the
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I
lstrippi.Jig on the steps, and the next morning she

jiiscovered bruises she described as being "fairly
_arge sized, wide, and fairly far apart.

l37)

(R.

135-

Marilyn testified that the defendant told

ier that C-f'&:ig had been playing on the stairs
I

dth Margie's kid, and had fallen.
There was also the time in the middle of
September when Craig hurt his mouth.

I

He had been

dth the def'endant while driving to a nearby gas

station and back to Ed Webb 1 s place; and that the

1

!defendant told them that a little boy darted into
the road, and when he applied the brakes Craig
1it the dashboard.

There was a tooth loose and

bleeding badly, so Ed pulled it out.

(R. 139)

When she first saw the round burn it appear-

l"d

her as a

11

round blister, burn", and it appear-

as shown in Exhibit--#8--about a week later.

It

l3ccurred on a Sunday during the middle of Sept1ember, perhaps the 21st. She had it treated at
hospital that evening, cleaned and a bandage
!applied, and returned a few days later for further checking or treatment.

Marilyn testified

that while she was apartment hunting, with the
I

defendant driving her around, she was gone from

1

lthe car for about 10 minutes, at a gas station,
iearly in the afternoon.

(R. 129-132) She said

:he boy was subject to seizures and tantrums,
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with the worst of these being on the morning of
the blistered toes, and again on the evening of
October 5th; she described the symptoms --he
would start shaking, turn blue or black, shut
his eyes, tighten up, hold his breath, and then
swallow his tongue--and she had no idea of the
cause.

They were worse than the tantrums, and

she was upset by them--several times she had to
pry his tongue out of the mouth with a spoon.
(R. 186-181)

She said that she never hit the

boy on the head, but admitted that once Margie
told her not to paddle Craig so hard, but he had
, just wet all over a new couch.

(R. 189)

Maxine Crowder described the round burn as
having dry skin like a popped blister, crusty
around the edges,

and didn't look fresh that

day when she first discovered it.

She described

Craig as a "good little boy--he never cried and
!

never had a seizure", and that she used to take
care of Craig quite a bit.

(R. 203, 205-206)

Edward R. Webb testified that Craig had been
with defendant at gas station, but nothing was
wrong then; defendant fell behind on way back,
and the last time he saw Craig, the child was
standing up in the car.

The route passed a

school, and Craig's mouth was bloody, and he
pulled a tooth out.

(R.206-209)
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Shirley Peterson, Craig's grandmother, said
1

that she had him the Saturday before the round
burn was discovered, and didn't notice anything,
although she bathed him. (R. 315)
Margie Williams testified that she had known
Marilyn for two years and they lived together at

I

: 13th South for a while (R. 317); she had been to

i

)Provo for a schizo personality which she couldn't
describe; she was present when the toes were burned, and accompanied Marilyn to the hospital;(R.
319)

(R. 327-28)

said that on the night of the

fatal injuries she was watching through the window of the kitchen and saw the defendant carry
Craig down the stairs by his ears, after which,
she just left.

(R.325-326 ) She talked to some

relatives and returned some of defendant's things
but didn't make any statements exculpatory of him.

(R. 330-332)

She was recalled after defense mot-

ion to dismiss was denied, and added that she
had a conversation with the defendant, and added
some details respection the manner he held the
ears.

(R. 323-327)
The defense witnesses generally testified

that on the evening of October 5th the defendant
had been treating Craig Peterson very carefully;
that they had some conversations with Margie
Williams where she told them that Marilyn was
-21-

,...-

\

lying about things, and that she had to stop her
from beating on Craig many times.

(R. 336-337)

She also admitted to these witnesses that the
defendant had been very good to her kids, as well
being good to Craig, and further, just wasn't

1

! the type. (R.

356)

The defendant 1 s uncle, Doyle

Simmons, recalled finding some of the property
on the vacant side of the duplex on 13th; he
was present at conversations with Margie. Rita
Andreason, defendant's mother testified that when
they were all at Allen's on the 5th that the
baby looked sick, feverish, not well, and that
he was wearing a little cap; and that out at the
house, she never saw such a filthy place; that
Marilyn never took a thing off the baby; there
was not even a sheet on the dirty mattress in
the crib.

(R. 348-356)

The baby was unusually

quiet, he didn't stir a bit. Elmer Andreason
testified regarding the towing of the car and
that the defendant handled the child very carefully, just before they left, around 9:00 p.m.

II

after Marilyn asked him to take Craig for her.
(R. 334)

Bob Brewer, manager of the Uniroyal

i

shop where defendant was employed, testified

I

that during time in question defendant only missed a few hours of work, and gave the dates; and
recalled that a woman picked him up after work.
(R. 343-345) The defense rested. Officer Malmborg
was called in rebuttal; read some admissions
out of the statement taken from defendant. (R374)
-21A-

POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GRANT
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS TO DISMISS AND ALLOWED THE
JURY TO CONSIDER FIRST DEGREE MURDER AS A POSSIBLE VERDICT WHEN THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED WAS
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION OF MURDER
IN ANY DEGREE AS A MATTER OF LAW, THEREBY DEPRIVING APPELLANT OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
TO A FAIR TRIAL, DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION.
Utah Code Ann., § 76-30-1 (1953) defines
murder as:

11

[T]he unlawful killing of a human

being with malice aforethought."

To qualify as

murder, the statute requires not only a showing
of malice, but also "aforethought."

This sim-

ply means that the malice was thought out
beforehand, or previously planned or designed
or premeditated.

State v. Roedl, 107 Utah 538

(1945); State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116 (1944).
The design to kill or effect death must, of
course, be formed prior to commission of the
act in question.

State v. Mastato K.arnmai,

101 Utah 592 (1942).
Utah Code Ann.,

76-30-2 (1953) provides

that the requisite malice, the wish to kill or
do great bodily harm knowing its reasonable and
natural consequences would be death, may be express or implied:
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It is express when there is manifested a
deliberate intention unlawfully to take
the life of a fellow creature. It is implied when no considerable provocation
appears, or when the circumstances attending the killing show an abandoned and
malignant heart.
Although all murder in Utah requires a showing
i of

11

malice aforethought," Utah Code Ann.,

§ 76-30-3

(1953) provides two degrees for such

/killings:
Every murder perpetrated by poison, lying
in wait or any other kind of wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated killing;
or committed in the perpetration of, or
attempt to perpetrate, any arson, rape, burglary or robbery; or perpetrated from a
premeditated design unlawfully and maliciously to effect the death of any human
being other than the one who is killed; or
perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous
to the lives of others and evidencing a
depraved mind, regardless of human life;
--is murder in the first degree. Any other
homicide committed under such circumstances
as would have constituted murder at common law is murder in the second degree.
Appellant submits that upon the basis of
the evidence presented, a reasonable mind could
not be convinced or persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the death of the decedent was
caused by the wilful, deliberate, malicious

and premeditated actions of the accused, and
that such evidence was insufficient to sustain
a verdict of murder in the first degree on any
theory thereof, and was also insufficient to
sustain a verdict of murder in the second
i

degree.

In view of the evidence presented, the

question should only have been submitted on the
question of involuntary manslaughter.

It was

therefore error for the court in this case to
have instructed the jury on the question of
murder in any degree, where unsupported by any
evidence introduced therein.

State v. Condit,

101 Utah 558 (1942).
Clearly the evidence submitted in the
instant case was insufficient to establish
that the killing here was

11

wilful, deliberate,

' malicious and premeditated ••• ,
by

§

76-30-3.

11

as required

As this Court pointed out in

State v. Thompson, 110 Utah 113 (1946), for
this category of murder in the first degree:
CT1here must be a planned, designed and
previously thought out intention to kill
the person killed after a deliberate or
cool weighing and consideration of such
plan •••• Id. at 121.
The Court reiterated this point in State
v. Trujillo, 117 Utah 237 (1950).
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Murder in the first degree has added to
the
state of mind (required of
second degree murderj the elements of
deliberation and premeditation--elements
that imply a cool weighing and consideration of a means of accomplishing the
results of those malicious desires.
Id. at 633-34.
Also, in State v. Stenback, 78 Utah 350 (1931),
the Court observed:
To constitute a homicide murder in the
first degree, there must be present in the
mind of the accused not only an intention
to take the life of a human being, but
such intention must be characterized by
premeditation and deliberation. The intention to do an act which is calculated
to take the life of a human being is an
element common to the crimes of voluntary
manslaughter, murder in the second degree,
and murder in the first
Which,
if any, of the three ;:;rimes was committed
in a given case depends on the state of
mind under which the accused acted when
the homicide was committed. Id. at 358-59.
Although admittedly, no definite or fixed period of time for premeditation or reflection
need be shown, it is well established in the
case of State v. Anselmo, 46 Utah 137 (1915),
· that:
[j3Jome space of time, however brief for
premeditation, is necessary before the
fatal shot is fired or the fatal blow
is struck •••• .!!!• at 156.
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Even when considering all the evidence
in the light most favorable to the verdict,

Ithere

was nothing to show that the accused at

any time contemplated, designed or planned the
death of the deceased.

The most that could

have been established was that the accused had
on a few prior occasions injured or possibly
punished the deceased; that the deceased
appeared to have injuries characteristic of the
unfortunate, but medically recognized
abuse syndrome. 11

11

child-

To allow the jury to infer

the premeditation and deliberation required by
law for first degree murder from miscellaneous
1

instances of child abuse would render meaningless the traditional distinction between first
and second degree murder.

Indeed, the fact that

death occured some time after the fatal injury,
in circumstances where the alleged acts were
not interrupted, would appear to negate any
fixed intent or design to effect the death of
the deceased.

If such acts were sufficient to

i show the requisite premeditation and deliber-

ation, it would be difficult to envision any
i killing, however accidental or unexpected,

where a case of first degree murder could not
be made.
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Appellant further submits that this was
not a proper case of first degree murder "perpetrated by any act greatly dangerous to the
lives of others and evidencing a depraved mind,
regardless of human life ••• ,"within the meaning of

and that it was error to

instruct the jury accordingly.

The obvious in-

tention of the legislature in enacting this provision was to alleviate the necessity of any
specific intention to kill, otherwise required
of first degree murder, where potentially dangerous acts are directed against persons in
general rather than against any particular individual.

The variety of behavior towards which

this particular provision was directed was
correctly deliniated by this Court in State v.
Russell, supra, wherein it was

noted:

This [provision] requires an act which is,
at least potentially, dangerous to other persons and not directed against any one in
particular. Such an act is more dastardly
than where only one person can be endangered,
even though only one is affected thereby. No
doubt this was considered in making this
[type of action] murder in the first degree
without a specific intention to kill. This
division is distinguished from ••• [other sections of the statute] which require a specific intention to kill a particular person,
whereas here, no intention to kill
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is required, though an intention to kill
persons generally may exist •••• Id. at
129.
I

!This construction was cited with approval in
State v. Thom son, supra, where death
from an indiscriminate firing of a weapon into
a room known to contain several occupants.
Also, in the recent case of State v. Gillian,

23 Utah 2d 372 (1970), Ellett, J., in his dissenting opinion (for other reasons) suggested
1

the applicability of this portion of

§

76-30-3

I

:to a situation where one would throw a bomb

into crowded bleachers.

See 40 C.J.S., Homi-

cide § 31.
Clearly, this was not the situation in the
instant case.

Here, the evidence is undisputed

that the appellant's acts were directed toward
:and endangered only the life of the deceased
I

;and not people generally and indiscriminately.
Therefore, the trial court erred in submitting
/this question to the jury.
Appellant further maintains that the evijdence presented could not properly support a
I
1

verdict of second degree murder, and that it
was error to have instructed the jury on this

l
,point.

Although Utah Code Ann.,

76-30-3

(1953) adopts the common law defi.Aition of
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purder as second degree murder (where not made
first degree murder therein),

§

76-30-1 still

requires a showing of "malice aforethought 11 as
essential element to all murder.

No evi-

in the case at bar was introduced from
!which it could be inferred that the appellant
1acted maliciously, or that any such malice, if

so established, was

11

aforethought 11 or previously

!planned, designed or premeditated.
I
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POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMITTING
COLORED PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE DECEASED CHILD INTO
EVIDENCE WHERE THE PREJUDICIAL EFFECTS DUE TO
THE GRUESOME AND INFLAMMATORY NATURE OF THOSE
PHOTOGRAPHS FAR OUTWEIGHED ANY POSSIBLE PROBATIVE VALUE WITH RESPECT TO THE MATERIAL FACTS
IN ISSUE AND THEREBY DEPRIVED APPELLANT OF A
FAIR TRIAL.
During the course of the trial, the State
introduced into evidence a considerable number
of enlarged color photographs in support of
expert medical testimony.

These photographs

were discussed and examined by the jury with
reference both to earlier injuries sustained
by the deceased child at times prior to his
death, and with respect to certain injuries
causing death.
Appellant submits that the introduction of
this evidence served no legitimate purpose in
the trial and that the principal effect of such
photographs was to arouse the passion of the
jury and inflame them against the appellant
because of the horror of the crime.

Several

expert witnesses testified as to the nature
and extent of certain non-fatal injuries suffered by the deceased child prior to his death,
and competent medical testimony was taken to
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establish that the child died of head injuries
resulting in a "subdural hematoma."

The oral

testimony of the lay and medical witnesses was
entirely adequate to establish these facts, and
the cause of death and existence of prior minor
injuries to the deceased child were not serious-

ly disputed by the defense.
In view of the above, the admission into
evidence of the extremely gruesome and horrid
colored photographs was needlessly repetitious
of largely uncontradicted oral testimony.

The

slight probative value, if any, of such photographs was clearly outweighed by their obvious
inflammatory nature in prejudicing the jury
against the appellant.
Although the admission of such evidence is
, initially within the sound discretion of the
trial court, this Court, speaking through
Callister, J., in State v. Poe, 21 Utah 2d 113
(1968), held it reversable error to admit such
evidence where its inflammatory nature exceeded
any probative value with respect to a fact in
issue.

In the words of the Court:

All the material which could conceivably
have been adduced from a viewing of the
slides had been established by the uncontradicted lay and medical testimony. The
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only purpose served was to inflame and
arouse the jury. Id. at 117.
The Court in Poe found the admission of such
evidence so prejudicial to the rights of the
accused as even to forego the necessity of
timely objection at trial.
This Court's holding in Poe applies to the
instant case.

As in Poe, colored photographs

were taken from an autopsy of the deceased
child.

Also, colored photographs were admitted

detailing prior injuries to the deceased, the
relevancy of such injuries being highly conjectural.

The deceased being a twenty-month old

child, the admission of such evidence served
only to further heighten and accentuate the
already emotionally charged atmosphere to which
the jury was subjected.

Similar to Poe, the

actual cause of death, i.e., "subdural hematoma"
resulting from head injuries, was never seriously challenged by the defense.
Subsequent decisions appear to have slightly modified the thrust of Poe.

E.g., State v.

Jackson, 22 Utah 2d 4-08 (1969); State v. Renzo,
21 Utah 2d 205 (1968).

In these cases, the

Court allowed such evidence to show the depravity and viciousness of the assault.
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However,

depravity and viciousness
issue in the case at bar.
§

not properly at
Although Utah Code

76-30-3 (1953) includes "any act greatly

dangerous to the lives of others and evidencing
a 'depraved mind,

1

regardless of human life ••• ,"

as murder in the first degree, this provision
was obviously intended by the legislature to
include only such wanton and reckless acts as
,bombings or firing a weapon into a crowd, where
the requisite special intent required of murder
\in the first degree is not manifestly present.
!Nor was viciousness an issue at trial.

Vicious-

ness, as such, is not an element of first degree
murder, or of a lesser offense.
Many of the pictures admitted in evidence
went much further than simply depicting the
, direct consequences of the injuries sustained,
I and did little more than portray the gory pro-

\ cedures of the pathologist.

In so doing, the

' natural tendency was to emphasize and exaggerate the extent of such injuries beyond their
normal proportions.
In view of the above considerations, the
probative value of such evidence was minute
in comparison to their propensity to inflame
and prejudice the jury against the appellant.
-33-

They should have been excluded; their admission
in this case constitutes reversible error.

POINT III
THE STATE WITNESSES MARILYN PETERSON AND
MARGIE WILLIAMS WERE AS A MATTER OF LAW AND IN
FACT ACCOMPLICES WHOSE TESTIMONY REQUIRES INDEPENDENT CORROBORATION AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED
IN FAILING TO SO INSTRUCT THE JURY, AND BY ITS
DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS.
An accomplice is any person who could have
been charged along with the defendant as a principal in the crime. State v. Davie, 121 U. 184

(1952).

According to Utah Code Ann.,

76-1-44

(1953) this would include:
All persons concerned in the commission of
a crime, either felony or misdf'meanor,
whether they directly commit the act constituting the offense or aid and abet in
its commission or, not being present, have
advised and encouraged its commission •••
are principals in any crime so committed.
Under this definition, it would seem clear
that Marilyn Peterson, mother of the rleceased
child, together with Margie Williams, an inhabitant of the Peterson home, were both
to the several alleged acts of abuse inflicted
upon the deceased child, and contributed tu
death.

The mother herself testified as to her

actual presence in the home, and at other places when the several injuries were suffered by
the deceased child.

She further testified that
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the child was almost continuously in her care,
save for the few instances where he was entrust/

to the care of others.

The mother moreover

admitted to having been restrained from beating
1
!the deceased so severely on at least one occasion by witness Margie Williams.

Were she not

an active participant in inflicting abuses upon
the child, her presence and acquiesence would
I

. certainly suggest her support and encouragement.

I

That she was criminally corrupt through such an
involvement, and thus an accomplice, cannot be
doubted.

State v. Bowman, 92 Utah 540 (1937);

and State v. Wade, 66 Utah 267 (1925).

The same

can be said of witness Margie Williams, whose
presence along with her close familiarity with
the deceased and the abuse inflicted ·upon him,
indicate a similar involvement and culpability.

This was certainly such a situation

as described by the California District Court
of Appeals in People v. Ortiz,

25 Cal. Rptr.

]27 (1962), wherein it observed:
One who is present and is aware of the acts
of the perpetrator of a crime and either
by acts of encouragement or warning or by
gestures aids or encourages the commission
of the crime is an aider and abetter and
may be charged as a principal. !2• at 333°
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The Indiana Supreme Court in the case of Cotton

v. State, 211 N.E. 2d 158 (1965) similarly
noted:
Even if there were not active
in the commission of the crime, failure to
oppose it at the time, companionship with
others engaged therein, and a course of
conduct before and after the offense are
such circumstances as may be considered in
determining whether aiding or abetting may
be inferred. Id. at 161.
Where such acts and conduct on the part of
the witnesses are found, it is for the
as a matter of law, to instruct the jury as to
whether the witness is an accomplice to the
crime.

State v. Coroles, 74 Utah 94 (1929);

see generally, 2 Wharton, Criminal Evidence,
443 et seq (12th ed. 1955) Moreover, such
failures of the trial court, where they appear
on the record, have frequently been corrected
by reviewing tribunals, even where no formal

objection was taken thereto.

See People v.

Mitchell, 166 P.2d 10 (Calif. 1946); and
Gregg v. Groesbeck, 11 Utah 310 (1895). See
also, State v. Clauson, 6 Utah 2d 160 (1957).
Under Utah law, the testimony of an accomplice requires independent corroboration. Utah
Code Ann.,

77-31-18 (1953) directs:
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A conviction shall nl:Yt be had on the testi-

mony of an accomplice, unless he is corroborated by other evidence, which in and of
itself and without the aid of the testimony of the accomplice tends to connect
the defendant with the commission of the
offense; and the corroboration shall not be
sufficient if it merely shows the commission of the offense or the circumstances
thereof ••••
This Court has made it clear in the case of
accomplices, that under this statutory provision
there must be some independent corroborating
evidence implicating the defendant in the
offense, and that such evidence must do more
' than cast a grave suspicion.
101 Utah 365 (1941).

State v. Erwin,

See also, State v. Bruner,

106 Utah 49 (1944); State v. Gardner, 83 Utah
145 (1933); and State v. Laris, 78 Utah 183
(1931).

In the absence of such corroborating

evidence, it is the duty of the court to direct
a verdict for the defendant.

State v. Somers,

97 Utah 132 (1939).
This was the situation in the instant case.
Absent the testimony of accomplices Marilyn
Peterson and Margie Williams, there remained not
so much as a grave suspicion to connect the
appellant to the injuries and death of the deceased child.

The extensive medical testimony

relates to the nature of the decedent's injuries
-37-

and the cause of his death was certainly not of
any substantive character as would connect the

Idefendant

with the commission of the crime

charged or identify him as the guilty
state v. Coroles, supra. 2 Wharton, Criminal Evi-

1

-

1dence, I 468.
e ven

11 the

This medical testimony shows not

commission of • • • [any J offense or the

circumstances thereof" and in no way is incon!

sistent with accidental death.

I§

77-31-18 (1955)
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Utah Code Ann.

POINT IV
THE CONVICTION OF THE APPELLANT WAS UNCONSTITUTIONAL UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION FOR THE REASON THAT
THE JURY DISCUSSED APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO TESTIFY AND CONSIDERED HIS SILENCE AS EVIDENCE OF
HIS GUILT, AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING
TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
WHICH WAS BASED ON THE MISCONDUCT OF THE JURY.
The United States Constitution insures that
11

No person ••• shall be compelled in a criminal

case to be a witness against himself. 11
Const., amend. V.
§

12.

See also,

U.S.

Utah Const. art. 1,

This important constitutional safeguard

has been extended to state proceedings via the
Fourteenth Amendment in the case of Malloy v.
Hogan, 368 U.S. 1 (1964).

Further protecting

this right, the United States Supreme Court,
in Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (i965),
held that the state could not make this privilege of silence "costly" and that it would be
error for the court or the prosecution, in a
jury case, to comment upon the failure of the
accused to take the stand in his own behalf.
Similarly, appellant submits that where the
jury, in its deliberations, weights appellant's
exercise of this constitutional right against
him, as it clearly did in the case at bar, that
such misconduct amounts to such prejudice as
-39-

would warrant a new trial.

Concerning this

misconduct, Mrs. Donna J. Johnson, a member of
/the jury, testified (R. 456-61) in support of
! her

affidavit (R. 92), in part, as follows:

:*

*

Q

*

*

(by Mr. Russell) How much of the discussion
in the jury room was concerned strictly with
[defendant's] failure to testify?

A

Well, I would say quite a bit ••• was centered on why he wasn't allowed to testify •••

*

*

*

ITHE COURT:
THE WITNESS:

Was it the basis for their verdict?
Yes, I believe it was.

THE COURT: You stated before ••• that in your
opinion the other evidence still showed his
guilt; •••• In other words, were the other
facts considered in this case along with
the Defendant's failure to take the stand,
or was the verdict based on just his failure to take the stand?
, THE WITNESS:
alone.

*

Well, it wasn't based on that

*(by Mr.
*

Q

Russell) If I could ask •••• had
discussion of his failure to testify not
been a significant part of the deliberations, would you have concurred in the
verdict of first degree murder?

A

No, I wouldn't have.
Appellant's motion for a new trial, based

on jury misconduct as well as other error discussed heretofore, was, upon further argument,
denied.
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such instances as presented here, the jury,
by its own misconduct effectively undermines all

/the constitutional protections accorded the de-

l!endant in any criminal proceeding, and thereby
him a fair and impartial trial.
Although this Court does not appear to have
natl occasion to pass on this specific type of

misconduct involving a violation of Fifth Amend1.ment rights, several jurisdictions have been
!quick to correct such injustice where it arose.
In the early case of State v. Rambo, 69 Kan. 777,
17 P. 563 (1904), also a murder case, the Kansas
Supreme Court found that the jury's consideration of defendant's failure to testify would be
so prejudicial as to vitiate the verdict and
require a new trial.

The Kansas Court was of

.the further opinion that this type of misconduct
was tantamount to a consideration by the jury of

extraneous facts not in evidence, and under
such circumstances, a juror's testimony would
be admissible to impeach the verdict.

Likewise,

in Carrol v. State, 50 Tex. Crim. 485, 98 S.W.
859 (1906), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
ordered a reversal where it appeared that the
jury considered the defendant's failure totestify.

See also, State v. Hockett, 172 Kan. 1

238 P. 2d 539 (1952); DeLaRosa v. State, 167
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Tex. Crim. 23, 317 S.W. 2d 544 (1958); and Low
: v. State, 156 Tex. Crim. 34, 238 S.W. 2d 769

(1961).

These cases make clear, admittedly,

. that bare allusion to the fact of defendant's
failure to testify will not be sufficient for
reversal.

See Leal v. State, 169 Tex. Crim. 222,

332 S.W. 2d 729 (1959); Clark v. State, 398 S.W.
2d 763 (Tex. 1966); and State v. Hillstrom, 46
Utah 341 (1915).

This was not the situation

with the case at bar, as here, the jury appears
to have given substantial weight to the appellant 1 s failure to testify.
The long prevailing view, in this jurisdiction and others, has been that a juror cannot by
affidavit or otherwise, impeach his own verdict.
See State v. Rivenburgh, 11 utah 2d 95 (1960);
and State v. Priestly, 97 Utah 158 (1939).

The

policy here, quite obviously, is to preserve the
secrecy and integrity of jury deliberations, pt·otect individual jurors from undue harassment,
and add some finality to such proceedings.

See

State v. Athorn, 46 N.J. 247, 216 A. 2d 368
(1966).

This rule notwithstanding, the courts

have readily recognized that no inflexible rule
can be laid down here, as cases arise where the
plainest principles of justice demand that a
new trial be directed on a proper showing of
-42-

I

:jury misconduct.

In maintaining this delicate

,balance, several exceptions have long been observed.

See Hathaway v. Marx, 21 Utah 2d 33

(1968).

For example, this Court and others have

shown little hesitancy in striking down verdicts
based upon chance or compromise, or where based
on extraneous facts not in evidence, or where
the jury acts in clear disregard of the court's
,instructions.

See, e.g., State v. Athorn, supra.

Appellant submits that where the jury chooses to
ignore the instructions of the court and acts in
violation of appellant's right to remain silent,
and suffer no prejudice thereby, then an examination of the jury's deliberations becomes even
more compelling.
Furthermore, Utah has by statute specifically enumerated those types of jury misconduct
which necessarily warrant a new trial.

In these

instances, the statute expressly provides for
impeachment of the verdict by affidavits.
Code Ann., § 77-38-3 (1953).

Utah

Among the statu-

tory grounds warranting a new trial are the following:

....
(3)

[A]ny [jury] misconduct by which a fair
and due consideration of the cause may
be prevented.

-43-

(4)

When the verdict has been determined
••• by any means other than a fair expression of opinion on the part of all
the jurors.

(5)

When the court has misdirected the
jury as a matter of law, or has erred
in the decision of any question of law
arising during the course of the trial,
or has done or allowed any action in
the cause prejudicial to the substantial rights of the defendant.

(6)

When the verdict ••. is contrary to
law or the evidence.

The foregoing legislative exceptions to the
rule that jurors cannot impeach their own verdict, reasonably construed, easily subsume that
type of misconduct complained of in the case at
bar, i.e., an adverse consideration of appellant's right to remain silent.

In fact, it is

difficult to imagine any other jury misconduct
more in point.

Surely such misconduct would

have been prevented had the jury taken a
and due consideration of the cause."

11

fiir

Further,

where the jury in reaching its verdict considers
defendant's failure to testify as a factor
against him, such a verdict would certainly not
be considered the product of "a fair expression
of opinion on the part of all the jurors," and
would be "prejudicial to the substantive rights
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of the defendant."

In any event, the type of

jury misconduct found in the instant case, in
clear disregard of the court's instructions
as opposed to a mere misunderstanding -- is
without doubt, "contrary to law ••• [and admissible] evidence."

See Youngkin v. Maurer, 74

Ariz. 67, 243 P. 2d 780 (1952); and State v.
Rosenberg, 84 Utah 402 {1934). The proscriptions
found in subsections (3),
§

(4),

(5), and (6) of

77-38-3 are indeed very broad in their sweep

and clearly encompass that variety of misconduct which transgresses a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights.

Furthermore, being essential-

ly remedial in nature, these provisions are
entitled to a liberal construction by the Court.
In the early case of State v. Morgan, 23
Utah 212 (1901), this Court, through Baskin, J.,
had occasion to construe the predecessor to
g 77-38-3.

Revised Statutes, § 4952 (1898).

In that case, also involving first degree murder, this Court made it clear that jury misconduct in falsely answering to voir

examina-

was so prejudicial to the rights of the accused
as to require a new trial.

The Court declared:

The cases are numerous which hold that the
misconduct by one or more of the jury which
might have been prejudicial to the accused
raises a presumption, especially in a
-45-

capital case, that the accused has been prejudiced thereby and vitiates the verdict unless the prosecution shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the prisoner has received
no injury by reason thereof.
Id. at 226
(emphasis added).
lhe Court in Morgan suggested that the miscon-

uct there complained of would easily come withthe meaning of subsections ( 3) and (4) of

n

77-38-3.

The Court further found that even

f the above mentioned legislative provisions

a new trial were not applicable, that the
'tah Const., art. 1,

§

12, required protection

I

'against such jury misconduct.
the

In the words of

Court:
In the absence of any iegislative remedy
for such wrongs, the courts will resort to
the common law if it affords a remedy and
if it does not, then the courts, by virtue
of their inherent powers, and their duty in
criminal cases to guard the rights of persons will, if possible, devise new remedies,
as has been done from a very remote period
of time, by equity courts, to meet new conditions and supply remedies for wrongs,
when none already existed. Morgan at 228.
Appellant maintains that the jury's miscon-

duct in the instant case, in considering his
failure to testify against himself, is no less
prejudicial to his right to a fair trial than
would be the case, as in Morgan, where individ-
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ual jurors had misrepresented their preconceived
opinions of guilt on

dire examination.

The

prejudice to the appellant is even greater in
the case at bar, involving as it does, not only
a violation of his rights under the Utah Const.,
art. 1,

12, but also an obvious denial of his

Fifth Amendment right under the Federal Constitution to remain silent and suffer no penalty
therefrom.

-Further, the affidavit and testi-

mony of Mrs. Johnson in the case at bar establishes that at least one juror clearly disregarded the instructions of the court.

Under the

Morgan rationale, this would raise the presumption of prejudice to appellant which must then
be dispelled, if possible, by the State.
The instructions given by the court to the
jury are

11

the law of the case, 11 and although the

jury may have the power to disregard the court's
admonitions, it never has the right to do so.
See, e.g., McDonald v. Peters, 128 Mont. 241,
272 P. 2d 730 (1954).

C.f., People v. Ward,

381 Mich. 624, 166 N.W. 2d 451 (1969).

In such

circumstances, it will be the duty of the trial
court to correct such abuses by granting a new
trial, to which appellant, under the provisions
of Utah Code

Ann.,

§

77-38-3 (1953) is entitled.

Robinson v. Herinson, 17 Utah 2d 261 (1965); and
Jorgensen v. Gonzales, 14 Utah 2d 330 (1963).
-47-

POINT V
THAT THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE FORGOING
ASSIGNED ERRORS DEPRIVED THE APPELLANT OF
A FAIR TRIAL
Appellant submits that each of the forgoing
errors assigned presents adequate grounds upon
which this Court could reverse and order a new
trial.
no

Should this Court find, however, that

single issue, by itself, particularly in

capital cases,

11

to scrutinize with care the

propriety of all aspects of the preceedings. 11
State v. St.

3 Utah 2d 230 (1955).

)And in so doing:
[I]f there is a reasonable liklihood
that in the absence of such errors a
different verdict might have been
rendered, a new trial should be granted.
Id.
at 244.
It was early recognized by this Court that
·
e'lch

may be several error;! in a trial, and
may not independently be sufficiently

_,.._"ejuu.ical to warrant a reversal, but when each
is viewed in conjunction with the others, the
cumulative effect will amount to the denial of
a fair trial.

This position was established in
101 Utah 444

(1942), and

reaffirmed by this Court in State v.
St. Clair, supra, wherein it was said:
-J 8-

It is recognized that a combination of
errors which, when singly considered
might be thought insufficient to warrant
a reversal, might in their cumulative
effect do so.
Id. at

An examination of the record in the instant
case reveals that the forgoing errors,
cumulatively considered, prevented the appellant
from receiving a fair trial.
The obvious misconduct of the jury in considering appellant's failure to testify against
him amounted to a violation of appellant's

fifth Amendment right to remain silent, as well
as his right to a trial by an "impartial jury"
graranteed by the Utah Constitution, art. 1
12, and clearly

him to a. new trial.

Even more prejudical, however, was the insufficiency of the evidence introduced at
trial to sustain a charge of murder in the
first degree, of for that matter, any degree
of murder.

When the error of discretion in

allowing the admission of gruesome and inflammatory photographs of the deceased child into
evidence, over objection, is considered in
conjunction with the error created by allO\•'ing evidence adduced through the uncorroborated
testimony of accomplices to be considered by
the jury without the necessary and required
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instructions, the cumulative effect of
these errors deprived appellant of a fair
trial.
CONCLUSION
The appellant respectfully contends that
1

the conviction of murder in the first degree
should be set aside.

Defense motions for

dismissal and for a new trial were improperly
denied.

The prejudicial effect of the failure

of adequate instructions regarding accomplices
along with the inflammatory and gruesome photographic evidence is clearly reversible error.
The conduct of the jury falls so far short of
constitutional standards as to per !!.!: require
reversal and remand for a new trial.
The judgment should be reversed and the
appellant discharged, or in the alternative,
the judgment should be reversed and remanded
with appropriate and adequate directions to
the trial Court.
Respectfully submitted,
GLEN S; HATCH
JOHN D.' RUSSELL

Attorneys for
Defendant-Appellant.
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